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ABSTRACT—The United States Marshals Service (USMS) photographs 
every arrested suspect as part of the booking process. These photographs, 
called mug shots, are federal government records to which the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) applies. Federal appellate courts have disagreed 
about whether FOIA requires disclosure of these mug shots or whether 
FOIA Exemption 7(C) applies, allowing the USMS to withhold them as 
law enforcement records that “could reasonably be expected to constitute 
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” if released. This Note argues 
that Exemption 7(C) should shield mug shots from disclosure to the public. 
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From 1996 until late 2012, the United States Marshals Service 
(USMS) released arrestees’ mug shots in response to requests under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1 that came from the jurisdiction of the 
Sixth Circuit.2 This policy accommodated the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Department of Justice, which clearly required 
the USMS to disclose arrestees’ mug shots in response to FOIA requests.3 
However, on December 12, 2012, the USMS General Counsel issued a 
memorandum stating that, effective immediately, the USMS would no 
longer release federal arrestees’ mug shots in response to FOIA requests 
unless doing so would serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, such as 
apprehending a fugitive or alerting victims.4 The USMS justified its 
decision by relying on two more recent federal appellate court opinions that 
exempted mug shots from disclosure under FOIA.5 By implementing this 
 
1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. II 2007–2009). 
2 See Memorandum from Gerald M. Auerbach, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Marshals Serv., to All U.S. 
Marshals et al. 2 (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/marshals/foia/policy/booking_photos.pdf. 
3 73 F.3d 93, 97 (6th Cir. 1996). 
4 See Memorandum from Gerald M. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 2–3. The new policy also allows for 
disclosure if the USMS Office of the General Counsel determines for itself that a FOIA “requester has 
made the requisite showing that the public interest in the requested booking photograph outweighs the 
privacy interest at stake.” Id. at 3. 
5 See id. (citing World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825 (10th Cir. 2012); 
Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
1141 (2012)). 
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new policy, the USMS has taken it upon itself to disregard a federal 
appellate court’s decision requiring the disclosure of mug shots. 
Law enforcement officers take mug shots, formally known as booking 
photographs, after bringing an individual into custody. People curious 
about their neighbors’ alleged wrongdoing can visit one of countless 
websites that publish these photographs. Mug shots depict people of all 
ages, races, socioeconomic groups, and celebrity statuses in one of the most 
humiliating moments of their lives.6 Although these websites include 
disclaimers reminding viewers that arrestees are innocent until proven 
guilty,7 the aura of guilt surrounding these photographs—with their stark, 
cinder-block backgrounds and the subjects’ often sullen facial 
expressions—is unmistakable. 
These websites and news organizations cannot publish mug shots 
unless law enforcement agencies release them. Whether and how websites 
and news organizations are able to obtain mug shots from state law 
enforcement agencies depends on each state’s open records laws.8 But 
people charged with federal crimes typically have their mug shots taken by 
the USMS, a federal law enforcement agency. Therefore, a federal law—
FOIA—applies to the disclosure of federal mug shots. 
FOIA is a federal statute designed to increase government 
transparency by giving the public access to information about the 
government.9 But FOIA includes several exemptions that allow government 
agencies like the USMS to not disclose some information. Two of these 
exemptions provide some protection for individuals whose privacy may be 
invaded by the release of government records to the public.10 Exemption 6 
allows the government to withhold “personnel and medical files and similar 
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy.”11 Similarly, Exemption 7(C) allows the 
government to withhold “records or information compiled for law 
enforcement purposes” when the disclosure “could reasonably be expected 
to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”12 Because both 
exemptions relate to personal privacy, courts considering Exemption 7(C) 
 
6 See, e.g., Mugs in the News, CHI. TRIB., http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-mug-
photogallery,0,5488047.photogallery (last visited Nov. 26, 2013); Mug Shots, TAMPA BAY TIMES, 
http://www.tampabay.com/mugshots (last visited Nov. 26, 2013); Mug Shots, THE SMOKING GUN, 
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/mugshots (last visited Nov. 26, 2013); US Counties, MUGSHOTS.COM, 
http://www.mugshots.com/US-Counties (last visited Nov. 26, 2013). 
7 See, e.g., Mugs in the News, supra note 6. 
8 See THE REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, POLICE RECORDS: A REPORTER’S 
STATE-BY-STATE ACCESS GUIDE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS (2008). 
9 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989). 
10 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (2006). 
11 Id. § 552(b)(6). 
12 Id. § 552(b)(7)(C). 
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have often relied on previous cases involving Exemption 6,13 despite 
differences between the two exemptions’ applicability based on type of 
requested documents and level of privacy invasion.14 
Exemptions 6 and 7(C) create some tension between competing 
interests: FOIA’s purpose of increasing government transparency and the 
need to protect the personal privacy of individuals in some situations. As a 
result of this tension, courts apply a balancing test to determine whether the 
FOIA privacy exemptions apply.15 Courts weigh the invasion of an 
individual’s privacy against the public interest served by disclosure to 
determine whether the FOIA privacy exemptions apply to the requested 
information.16 
This Note examines the highly contentious application of Exemption 
7(C) to federal criminal arrestees’ mug shots. Three federal courts of 
appeals have considered this issue using the balancing test.17 The Sixth 
Circuit was the first to do so and found in favor of disclosure because it 
identified no privacy interest on the part of the arrestees depicted in the 
mug shots.18 The next two federal appellate courts to consider the question, 
the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, created a circuit split by finding in favor 
of nondisclosure and exempting arrestees’ mug shots from release under 
FOIA.19 
Between 1996 and 2012, Exemption 7(C) did not apply when a FOIA 
request for a mug shot came from the Sixth Circuit but did apply to 
requests originating from all other jurisdictions.20 Because the USMS 
policy considered the location of the FOIA requestor and not the location 
where law enforcement took the mug shot, FOIA requestors were able to 
easily circumvent the policy by making their requests from within the Sixth 
Circuit’s jurisdiction. In practice, therefore, no federal arrestees enjoyed 
privacy protection for their mug shots despite two federal courts of appeals 
finding that their privacy interests were significant enough for Exemption 
7(C) to apply. On December 12, 2012, the USMS suddenly changed its 
policy and no longer discloses mug shots in response to FOIA requests 
unless doing so would serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose.21 Now, 
 
13 See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 96–97 (6th Cir. 1996). 
14 Compare § 552(b)(6), with § 552(b)(7)(C). 
15 See, e.g., Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372–73 (1976). 
16 Id. 
17 World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 830–32 (10th Cir. 2012); Karantsalis v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 502–04 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 
(2012); Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 96–98. 
18 Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 97. 
19 World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 826; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 499, 504. 
20 This was the USMS policy until December 12, 2012. See Memorandum from Gerald M. 
Auerbach, supra note 2. 
21 Id. at 2–3. 
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this government agency is blatantly ignoring the clear holding of a federal 
appellate court. 
This Note argues that FOIA Exemption 7(C) should apply to arrestees’ 
mug shots because their release constitutes a significant invasion of privacy 
that outweighs the limited information about the government provided by 
disclosure. Part I discusses the legislative history and Supreme Court 
interpretations of FOIA. These precedents provide the legal framework for 
analyzing the question of mug shot disclosure under Exemption 7(C). 
Part II explores the circuit split and analyzes the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits’ applications of the balancing test. Part III examines the privacy 
and public interests at stake and concludes that federal mug shots should 
not be released in response to FOIA requests under Exemption 7(C). 
I. THE HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT 
A. FOIA’s Purpose: Increasing Government Transparency 
In 1946, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to 
regulate administrative agencies.22 APA Section 3, the Public Information 
Section, required administrative agencies to publish their rules, opinions, 
and orders in the Federal Register.23 This section also required 
administrative agencies to make official records “available to persons 
properly and directly concerned.”24 But agencies could still withhold 
information from the public under the APA for three reasons. First, 
information could be withheld if the disclosure involved a “function of the 
United States requiring secrecy in the public interest.”25 Second, “any 
matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency” need not be 
disclosed.26 And third, opinions, orders, and official records could also be 
withheld if “required for good cause to be held confidential.”27 
According to the House Report on the subject, Congress intended the 
Public Information Section to give the public access to the operations and 
procedures of administrative agencies.28 But in practice, the statute had the 
opposite effect. Rather than using the Public Information Section to provide 
information to the public, administrative agencies used it as authority to 
 
22 See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 3 (1966). 
23 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946). 
24 Id. § 1002(c). 
25 Id. § 1002. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. § 1002(b); see also id. § 1002(c) (requiring “matters of official record [to] be made 
available . . . except information held confidential for good cause found”). 
28 H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 3 (1966). 
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withhold information by interpreting the exemptions broadly and invoking 
them often.29 
In response to agencies’ abuse of the APA’s exemptions, members of 
Congress sought to amend the Public Information Section.30 After five 
years of proposed legislation, these efforts succeeded when Congress 
passed what is now known as the Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA, to 
close the loopholes in the APA’s Public Information Section by 
“establish[ing] a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless 
information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language.”31 
Congress intended FOIA to transform the APA’s Public Information 
Section from a withholding statute to a disclosure statute by replacing 
vague, easily abused phrases with workable standards to distinguish 
between disclosed and withheld records; by eliminating the requirement 
that the person requesting the records be directly concerned; and by 
providing a court remedy in the event of the government’s wrongful 
nondisclosure.32 
The Supreme Court has considered FOIA’s legislative history and 
remarked on the Act’s purpose. In the first FOIA case to reach the Supreme 
Court, EPA v. Mink,33 the Court recounted FOIA’s legislative history and 
determined that FOIA is “broadly conceived . . . to permit access to official 
information.”34 Although the 1974 amendments to FOIA superseded Mink’s 
interpretation of the scope of appropriate judicial review of Exemption 1,35 
this opinion has remained influential on the Supreme Court’s analysis of 
FOIA’s purpose.36 In particular, the Mink Court’s qualification of the type 
 
29 See id. at 5–6; S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 5 (1965); Daniel Gorham Clement, The Rights of 
Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business Information: The Reverse Freedom 
of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEX. L. REV. 587, 596 (1977). 
30 These amendment efforts began in earnest during the 85th Congress when Congressman John E. 
Moss and Senator Thomas E. Hennings introduced simultaneous bills to revise substantially the Public 
Information Section. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 3–4. Although the 85th Congress took no action on 
these bills, the next three Congresses saw similar bills introduced with a correspondingly similar lack of 
final action. Id. 
31 S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3; Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 250. The Act of 
July 4, 1966, enacted Senate Bill 1160, which was a modified version of the Moss–Hennings bill first 
introduced during the 85th Congress. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 3–4. 
32 Act of July 4, 1966, § 3(c), (e)–(g), 80 Stat. at 251; S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 5–6. 
33 410 U.S. 73 (1973), superseded in part by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), (b)(1) (Supp. V 
1971–1976), as recognized in CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 189 & n.5 (1985). 
34 Id. at 79–80 (emphasis added). 
35 See Sims, 471 U.S. at 189 & n.5; NLRB. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 226 
(1978). 
36 Eleven FOIA Supreme Court opinions have favorably cited EPA v. Mink for its interpretation of 
FOIA’s purpose and legislative history after it was superseded by the 1974 amendments. See Milner v. 
Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1262 (2011); U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 
U.S. 487, 494 (1994); John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151–52 (1989); U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 151, 153 (1989); U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772 (1989); FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 23 (1983); FBI v. 
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of information—“official”—that Congress intended to be disclosed under 
FOIA proved significant in later developments of the law.37 
Despite wanting to eliminate agency abuse of loopholes, Congress 
recognized the continuing need for some exemptions to disclosure under 
FOIA.38 Congress had found that agencies abused the Public Information 
Section’s exemptions “to deny legitimate information to the public.”39 But, 
as Congress recognized, some legitimate reasons for withholding 
information from the public exist, and FOIA delineates those reasons in 
nine disclosure exemptions.40 As originally enacted in 1966, only one of 
these exemptions, Exemption 6, related to privacy. It allowed the 
government to withhold “personnel and medical files and similar files the 
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy.”41 Congress was sensitive to the impact that increased 
public access to government records under FOIA could have on an 
individual’s privacy. And it sought to strike an appropriate balance between 
personal privacy and the overall goal of increased government 
transparency.42 By requiring a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy” for Exemption 6 to apply, Congress intended to “provide[] a 
proper balance between the protection of an individual’s right of privacy 
and the preservation of the public’s right to Government information by 
excluding those kinds of files the disclosure of which might harm the 
individual.”43 
Since its enactment in 1966, Exemption 6’s text has not changed.44 
However, Exemption 7 originally did not mention privacy.45 That changed 
eight years later in 1974. 
B. Exemption 7: From Prosecution to Privacy 
The original language of Exemption 7 excluded from disclosure 
“investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the 
 
Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982); id. at 636 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 
U.S. 345, 352 & n.7 (1982); Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 
144 (1981); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1980); 
Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360 (1976). 
37 See Mink, 410 U.S. at 80; infra notes 77–79, 110 and accompanying text. 
38 See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 8–10 (1965). 
39 Id. at 3. 
40 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006); S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 8–10. 
41 Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, § 3(e)(6), 80 Stat. 250, 251. The only other mention of 
privacy in FOIA as originally enacted allowed agencies publishing opinions and orders to delete 
identifying details “[t]o the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.” Id. § 3(b), 80 Stat. at 250. 
42 See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 11 (1966). 
43 See id. 
44 § 552(b)(6); Act of July 4, 1966, § 3(e)(6), 80 Stat. at 251. 
45 Act of July 4, 1966, § 3(e)(7), 80 Stat. at 251. 
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extent available by law to a private party.”46 The legislative history 
indicates that Congress included Exemption 7 out of concern that 
disclosure could hurt government prosecutions47 and to make sure that 
parties could not use FOIA to receive advance or expanded discovery.48 
Seven years after FOIA’s enactment, Congress expanded disclosure 
under FOIA and limited the scope of the exemptions.49 Exemption 7 
changed significantly due to an earlier congressional review that found that 
agencies were abusing Exemption 7 by comingling exempt and nonexempt 
documents and then claiming the entire file as exempt.50 Additionally, 
courts were interpreting it as a nearly blanket exemption for all law 
enforcement files.51 
To rectify these problems, Congress replaced the word “files” with 
“records”52 and rewrote Exemption 7 to allow the government to withhold 
investigatory records only when one of six specified situations applied.53 
Among these is Exemption 7(C), which allows the government to withhold 
“investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to 
the extent that the production of such records would . . . constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”54 
Although the overall goal of the Exemption 7 changes was to narrow 
its scope, Exemption 7(C) provided more privacy protection than FOIA’s 
other privacy exemption. Unlike Exemption 6, which required “a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”55 for nondisclosure, 
Exemption 7(C) only required “an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”56 Without the word “clearly,” Exemption 7(C) is more protective 
 
46 Id. 
47 S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965). 
48 H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 11. 
49 Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2, 88 Stat. 1561, 1563–64. 
50 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-1419, at 7, 84 (1972); 120 CONG. REC. 36,629 (1974) (statement of Rep. 
Erlenborn). 
51 120 CONG. REC. 34,162 (1974) (statement of Rep. Moorhead). 
52 The House Committee on Government Operations proposed this language change after 
conducting extensive hearings in 1971 and 1972 to evaluate how FOIA was working. See H.R. REP. NO. 
92-1419, at 7, 84. The House Committee concluded that agencies were abusing the exemptions in the 
1966 FOIA, id. at 84, much like agencies had abused the APA’s Public Information Section, which 
FOIA sought to amend. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
53 Act of Nov. 21, 1974, § 2, 88 Stat. at 1563. 
54 Id. The other five situations that justified withholding investigatory records were when: 
[P]roduction of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a 
person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, . . . (D) disclose the identity of a 
confidential source and . . . confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, 
(E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of 
law enforcement personnel. 
Id. § 2(b), 80 Stat. at 1563–64. 
55 Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, § 3(e)(6), 80 Stat. 250, 251. 
56 Act of Nov. 21, 1974, § 2, 88 Stat. at 1563. 
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of privacy interests than Exemption 6 by establishing a lower bar for 
nondisclosure.57 
In 1986, Congress again amended Exemption 7 and provided greater 
privacy protection.58 The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 
expanded Exemption 7(C) from “would . . . constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy”59 to “could reasonably be expected to 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”60 The decision to 
relax the necessary level of privacy interest for nondisclosure from 
“would” to “could” was deliberate and the subject of debate.61 By changing 
the language of Exemption 7(C), Congress “broaden[ed] the reach of this 
exemption.”62 
Although Congress has amended FOIA four times since 1986,63 
Exemption 7(C)’s language as amended in 1986 is the same language that 
exists in the statute today.64 
 
57 120 CONG. REC. 36,878 (1974) (statement of Sen. Byrd); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989) (“Exemption 7(C)’s privacy 
language is broader than the comparable language in Exemption 6 . . . . [W]hereas Exemption 6 requires 
that the invasion of privacy be ‘clearly unwarranted,’ the adverb ‘clearly’ is omitted from Exemption 
7(C). This omission is the product of a 1974 amendment adopted in response to concerns expressed by 
the President.”). 
58 Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1802, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-
48 to -49. 
59 Act of Nov. 21, 1974, § 2, 88 Stat. at 1563. 
60 Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, § 1802, 100 Stat. at 3207-48. 
61 In 1981, the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution conducted extensive hearings on FOIA. 
See Freedom of Information Act, Volume 1: Hearings on S. 587, S. 1235, S. 1247, S. 1730, and S. 1751 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982). Two 
Congresses later, the FOIA amendments proposed after the 1981 hearings and then modified by the 
next Congress were adopted. See S. REP. NO. 98-221, at 6 (1983); 132 CONG. REC. 27,189 (1986). 
Members of the House wanted to substitute “could reasonably be expected to” in Exemption 7(C) with 
the word “would” to match the privacy standard in Exemption 6. See 132 CONG. REC. 29,620 (1986) 
(statement of Rep. Kindness). But members of the Senate insisted on the language “could reasonably be 
expected to” as identical to the earlier Senate-passed bill. See id. at 31,423 (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
The House accepted the Senate’s preferred language without further debate. See id. at 32,728, 32,743; 
see also Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, § 1802, 100 Stat. at 3207-48 (adopting the 
“could reasonably be expected to” language in Exemption 7(C)). 
62 132 CONG. REC. 31,424 (1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 
756 (footnote omitted) (“[W]hereas Exemption 6 refers to disclosures that ‘would constitute’ an 
invasion of privacy, Exemption 7(C) encompasses any disclosure that ‘could reasonably be expected to 
constitute’ such an invasion. This difference is . . . the product of a specific amendment. Thus, the 
standard for evaluating a threatened invasion of privacy interests resulting from the disclosure of 
records compiled for law enforcement purposes [under Exemption 7(C)] is somewhat broader than the 
standard applicable to personnel, medical, and similar files [under Exemption 6].”). 
63 See OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 564, 123 Stat. 2142, 2184 (amending 
Exemption 3, which governs nondisclosure of information when so specified by statute); Openness 
Promotes Effectiveness in Our National Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 12, 121 Stat. 
2524, 2530–31 (requiring agencies to inform the person making the FOIA request of the amount of 
information deleted “and the exemption under which the deletion is made”); Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, § 312, 116 Stat. 2383, 2390–91 (2002) (adding an 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
352 
C. FOIA Privacy Cases in the Supreme Court 
Since Congress enacted FOIA in 1966, the Supreme Court has decided 
nine FOIA privacy cases arising under either Exemption 6 or 
Exemption 7(C).65 Although Exemptions 6 and 7(C) are distinct 
exemptions, they both protect privacy,66 and the Court when analyzing 
information withheld under one exemption has looked to previous cases 
decided under the other.67 This Section discusses the doctrinal 
developments of the four Supreme Court cases that are relevant to the mug-
shot-disclosure question.68 
 
exemption for disclosure by intelligence agencies to foreign governments); Electronic Freedom of 
Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 3, 110 Stat. 3048, 3049 (expanding the 
definition of “record” to include information in an electronic format). 
64 Compare Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, § 1802, 100 Stat. at 3207-48 to -49, with 
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2006). 
65 FCC v. AT & T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (Exemption 7(C)); Nat’l Archives & Records 
Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004) (Exemption 7(C)); Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n, 519 U.S. 
355 (1997) (per curiam) (Exemption 6); U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487 
(1994) (Exemption 6); U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991) (Exemption 6); Reporters 
Comm., 489 U.S. 749 (Exemption 7(C)); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615 (1982) (Exemption 7(C)); 
U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982) (Exemption 6); Dep’t of the Air Force v. 
Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976) (Exemption 6). 
66 Besides Exemptions 6 and 7(C), only one other FOIA provision mentions privacy. Section 
552(a)(2)(E) permits “an agency [to] delete identifying details when it makes available or publishes an 
opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, staff manual, instruction, or copies of records” “[t]o the 
extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 
67 See, e.g., Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 495–96 (an Exemption 6 case relying on 
Exemption 7(C) case Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. 749); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 767–68 (an 
Exemption 7(C) case discussing Exemption 6 case Rose, 425 U.S. 352). 
68 This Note does not discuss Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. at 598, 602, or Abramson, 456 U.S. at 
623, 631–32, because those cases only analyze the threshold requirements of Exemptions 6 and 7, 
respectively. In the context of mug shots, the government easily satisfies Exemption 7’s threshold 
requirement that the requested information was “compiled for law enforcement purposes.” § 552(b)(7); 
see, e.g., Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 96 (6th Cir. 1996). The Supreme 
Court’s less than 400-word opinion in Bibles, 519 U.S. 355, did not add significantly to the 
developments of FOIA privacy jurisprudence. The Court simply reaffirmed two key doctrinal principles 
asserted clearly in earlier precedents and remanded the case for the appellate court to properly apply 
these principles. See id. at 355–56. The two most recent Supreme Court FOIA privacy cases, AT & T 
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, and Favish, 541 U.S. 157, do not contribute much to the mug-shot-disclosure 
question. In relation to the circuit split on the disclosure of mug shots, the Supreme Court decided these 
cases after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Detroit Free Press and before the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits’ decisions. But neither the Tenth nor Eleventh Circuit mentioned AT & T Inc. or Favish in their 
opinions. See World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825 (10th Cir. 2012); Karantsalis v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 (2012). 
In AT & T Inc., the Supreme Court held that the phrase “personal privacy” in Exemption 7(C) does not 
cover corporations. See 131 S. Ct. at 1184–85. Because mug shots involve the privacy interest of 
individuals and not corporations, the AT & T Inc. decision does not apply. In Favish, the Court held for 
the first time that FOIA’s “personal privacy” includes the privacy interests of family members. See 
Favish, 541 U.S. at 165; see also Martin E. Halstuk, When Is an Invasion of Privacy Unwarranted 
Under the FOIA? An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s “Sufficient Reason” and “Presumption of 
Legitimacy” Standards, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361, 363 (2005) (footnote omitted) (“In so 
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1. Narrow Construction and the Balancing Test.—In Department of 
the Air Force v. Rose,69 the Supreme Court made two important 
contributions to the interpretation of FOIA’s privacy exemptions. First, 
Rose explained that courts should narrowly construe those exemptions.70 
Second, Rose set forth the balancing test for disclosures involving privacy 
interests.71 Rose is also significant because it is the only one of the first six 
FOIA privacy cases in which the Supreme Court appeared to favor 
disclosure over privacy.72 
In Rose, editors of the New York University Law Review sought 
summaries of U.S. Air Force Academy honor and ethics disciplinary 
hearings to conduct a study on the disciplinary systems of military service 
academies.73 Even with the cadets’ names and other identifying information 
deleted, the Air Force Academy denied the request, claiming that 
Exemption 6 justified nondisclosure.74 FOIA places the burden of proof on 
the agency to justify its use of an exemption.75 
Before analyzing the specific application of the exemption, the Court 
discussed the general framework for approaching all FOIA requests.76 
Relying in part on its first FOIA decision in EPA v. Mink, which detailed 
FOIA’s legislative history,77 the Court found that the congressional purpose 
 
ruling, the [Favish] Court settled the question of family-privacy rights under the FOIA—an issue that 
lower courts have grappled with for more than a quarter-century.”). The privacy interest of family 
members might be relevant to the mug-shot-disclosure question, but neither circuit court that had the 
benefit of this additional Supreme Court FOIA privacy decision included that argument. See World 
Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d 825; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d 497. 
69 425 U.S. 352. 
70 Id. at 361. 
71 Id. at 372. 
72 See Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of Information Act 1966–2006: A 
Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection over the Public Interest in Knowing What the 
Government’s Up To, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 511, 541 n.184 (2006). 
73 Rose, 425 U.S. at 354–55. 
74 Id. at 355 & n.2. The Supreme Court also considered whether Exemption 2 supported the Air 
Force Academy’s decision to withhold the summaries. See id. at 362. Exemption 2 applies to 
“matters . . . related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.” Id. at 357 
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970)). The Supreme Court rejected this claim because Exemption 2 
does not apply when there is “a genuine and significant public interest” in disclosure. Id. at 369. The 
public has a significant interest in discipline at the Air Force Academy because of the necessity of 
proper discipline in an effective military. See id. at 367–68. 
75 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006) (“[T]he [district] court shall determine the matter de novo, and 
may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any 
part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and 
the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.”). A court might find that the government has waived 
exemptions not timely raised. For example, the Supreme Court acknowledged a district court’s finding 
that the Government had waived additional exemptions to justify nondisclosure when it only invoked 
those exemptions after the court denied its initial exemption claim. See U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 
U.S. 164, 171 (1991). However, the Court did not grant certiorari on that question. Id. at 172. 
76 Rose, 425 U.S. at 360–61. 
77 See id.; supra Part I.A. 
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behind FOIA was to establish a basic policy of agency disclosure.78 Based 
on that purpose, courts should narrowly construe all exemptions.79 
Relying heavily on FOIA’s legislative history, the Court found that 
Exemption 6 “require[s] a balancing of the individual’s right of privacy 
against the preservation of the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information 
Act ‘to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.’”80 Although the 
Supreme Court itself did not apply this balancing test to the Academy’s 
summaries,81 the Court implied that disclosure would likely be appropriate. 
First, the Court noted that withholding information under Exemption 6 
requires a privacy invasion that was “clearly unwarranted,” which is a 
heavier burden than the requirement of Exemption 7.82 Second, the Court 
found that the Air Force Academy’s policy of keeping most of the cadets’ 
identities confidential when it posted the summaries on Academy bulletin 
boards discounted the probability that disclosure of the redacted summaries 
would cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.83 
The Court was sympathetic to the privacy risk that disclosure created 
for the former cadets, especially those who continued working in the 
military,84 and agreed with the description that the court of appeals gave of 
the privacy values at stake: “identification of disciplined cadets—a possible 
consequence of even anonymous disclosure—could expose the formerly 
accused men to lifelong embarrassment, perhaps disgrace, as well as 
practical disabilities, such as loss of employment or friends.”85 But the 
Court noted that Exemption 6 did not require a guarantee against invasion 
of personal privacy through the disclosure of information, and that 
redaction has been relied on in other contexts to protect privacy.86 With the 
identifying information deleted, the Court strongly indicated that the 
summaries should be disclosed.87 
 
78 Rose, 425 U.S. at 361. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 372 (quoting Rose v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974), aff’d, 425 
U.S. 352). 
81 Instead, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’s order to have the district court review the 
summaries in camera to determine if redacting the cadets’ names and identifying information would 
sufficiently protect their privacy. See id. at 381. 
82 See id. at 378–79, 378 n.16. 
83 Id. at 380. It was the practice of the Air Force Academy to post the summaries on forty bulletin 
boards around the Academy and disseminate them to faculty and administration officials, id. at 359, but 
to not include names except in cases where the cadet was found guilty, id. at 377. Despite this previous 
limited disclosure of the summaries, Chief Justice Burger in dissent argued that the majority’s decision 
was unnecessarily complicated because he thought it “quite clear . . . that the disclosure of the material 
at issue here constitutes [a clearly unwarranted] invasion.” Id. at 382–83 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
84 Id. at 381 (majority opinion). 
85 Id. at 377 (quoting Rose, 495 F.2d at 267). 
86 Id. at 381–82. 
87 The Court found that Exemption 6’s limited protection “was directed at threats to privacy 
interests more palpable than mere possibilities,” id. at 380 n.19, and “does not protect [from] disclosure 
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In Rose, the Supreme Court established that Exemption 6 requires 
courts to conduct a balancing test by weighing the invasion of personal 
privacy against the public interest in disclosure to determine whether that 
invasion is clearly unwarranted. Thirteen years later, the Court used a 
similar balancing test for Exemption 7(C). 
2. Personal Privacy and FOIA’s Central Purpose.—The Supreme 
Court in U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom 
of the Press squarely addressed for the first time the meaning of the phrase 
“unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” in Exemption 7(C).88 Using the 
balancing test as articulated in Rose, the Court found that Exemption 7(C) 
applied to all requests for the FBI’s compilations of criminal records 
known as “rap sheets.”89 
To reach this conclusion, the Court compared the privacy language in 
Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C).90 As explained above,91 two differences 
made Exemption 7(C)’s privacy protection broader than Exemption 6’s 
protection.92 First, Congress deliberately omitted “clearly” from 
Exemption 7(C).93 Second, Congress intentionally amended 
Exemption 7(C) to ease the burden of demonstrating a sufficient privacy 
interest by changing “would constitute,” as used in Exemption 6, to “could 
reasonably be expected to constitute.”94 
The particular FOIA request in Reporters Committee involved 
journalists seeking the rap sheet for Charles Medico, whose family 
company had been linked to organized crime and a corrupt congressman.95 
The FBI generally kept rap sheets confidential and typically only released 
copies to the media when trying to catch wanted fugitives or to the 
subject.96 The Court noted that information in rap sheets is mostly a matter 
 
every incidental invasion of privacy,” id. at 382. That the Court’s decision points toward disclosure is 
also supported by the dissenting opinion, which characterized the Court’s decision as “blandly 
ignor[ing] and thereby frustrat[ing] the congressional intent by refusing to weigh, realistically, the grave 
consequences implicit in release of this particular information, in any form, against the relatively 
inconsequential claim of ‘need’ for the material alleged in the complaint.” Id. at 383 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
88 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
89 Id. at 751, 780. This adoption of a bright-line rule caused the only split in what otherwise would 
have been a unanimous opinion. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in the 
judgment because he disagreed with the majority’s categorical rule despite agreeing with the majority’s 
outcome in this particular case. Id. at 780 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
90 Id. at 756 (majority opinion). 
91 See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text. 
92 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 756. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 757. 
96 Id. at 752. 
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of public record in court documents.97 In only three states were the 
compilations of the scattered public records made available to the public.98 
The Court held that Medico’s privacy interest was sufficient to warrant 
nondisclosure under Exemption 7(C).99 In analyzing the privacy interest at 
stake, the Court rejected the FOIA requestors’ “cramped notion of personal 
privacy”: the reporters had argued that Medico’s privacy interest 
approached zero because the information contained in the rap sheets had 
previously been disclosed to the public.100 The Court found it significant 
that it would take considerable effort to locate criminal history information 
from nationwide public records in court files or newspaper archives.101 
The Court also considered the possibility that disclosure would 
compromise the subjects’ privacy interest in being forgotten.102 In 
discussing this aspect of privacy, the Court relied on Rose, where the cadets 
had “a privacy interest in past discipline that was once public but may have 
been ‘wholly forgotten.’”103 Likewise, individuals generally have a privacy 
interest in their criminal histories that may have been forgotten.104 The 
Court also found that technology made this privacy concern greater: “The 
privacy interest in a rap sheet is substantial” and “affected by the fact that 
in today’s society the computer can accumulate and store information that 
would otherwise have surely been forgotten long before a person attains 
age 80, when the FBI’s rap sheets are discarded.”105 Because the rap sheets 
compiled obscure or scattered, albeit public, information and disclosure 
could cause long-forgotten crimes to resurface, the Court found that 
disclosure implicated a substantial privacy interest within the meaning of 
Exemption 7(C).106 
Because Exemption 7(C) only applies to disclosures that would 
constitute an “unwarranted” privacy invasion, the Court next discussed 
what factors would warrant an invasion of privacy.107 The identity of the 
FOIA requestor is not a factor.108 Instead, the answer depends “on the 
nature of the requested document and its relationship to the basic purpose 
of the Freedom of Information Act to open agency action to the light of 
 
97 Id. at 753–54, 764. 
98 Id. 
99 See id. at 771, 775. 
100 Id. at 762–63. 
101 Id. at 764. 
102 Id. at 769. 
103 Id. (quoting Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 381 (1976)). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 771. 
106 Id. at 764, 769, 771. 
107 Id. at 771. 
108 Id. 
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public scrutiny.”109 Referring to EPA v. Mink, the Court noted that “[i]n our 
leading case on the FOIA, we declared that the Act was designed to create 
a broad right of access to ‘official information.’”110 To warrant an invasion 
of privacy, the disclosure of the requested document must inform citizens 
about “what their government is up to” by “shed[ding] . . . light on the 
conduct of a[] Government agency or official.”111 
In cases like Reporters Committee, where private citizens have 
requested information about another private citizen, the Court has found 
that there is no significant public interest in disclosure.112 The privacy 
invasion is “unwarranted” when the request “seeks no ‘official information’ 
about a Government agency, but merely records that the Government 
happens to be storing.”113 
In addition to providing the first Supreme Court analysis of the 
meaning of “personal privacy” and “unwarranted” in Exemption 7(C), 
Reporters Committee articulated the central purpose of FOIA: “to ensure 
that the Government’s activities be opened to the sharp eye of public 
scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that happens to be in 
the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed.”114 This definition is 
significant because it means that when courts balance the privacy interest at 
stake against the public interest served by disclosure, only those disclosures 
that contribute to FOIA’s central purpose can outweigh an invasion of 
personal privacy. Five years after Reporters Committee, the Court showed 
its firm commitment to the central purpose test. 
3. The Central Purpose Test: Disclosure Must Shed Light on 
Government Action.—In the 1994 case of U.S. Department of 
Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, the Supreme Court remained 
committed to the doctrine that the public interest side of the balancing test 
includes only how the disclosure would shed light on what the 
“government is up to.”115 In response to a union’s request for the home 
 
109 Id. at 772 (quoting Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
110 Id. (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973), superseded in part by statute, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(4)(B), (b)(1) (Supp. V 1971–1976), as recognized in CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 189 & n.5 
(1985)). 
111 Id. at 773 (quoting Mink, 410 U.S. at 105 (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 780. 
114 Id. at 774. Justice Blackmun’s concurrence did not criticize the central purpose test. Id. at 780–
81 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). His only complaint was regarding the majority’s use of 
a bright-line rule. Id. 
115 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994) (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773). The Court was 
unanimous on the outcome in this case with Justice Souter concurring and Justice Ginsburg concurring 
in the judgment. Justice Souter wrote a very brief concurrence to emphasize the limited nature of the 
majority’s opinion. Id. at 504 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg found that the majority opinion 
correctly applied the Court’s precedent from Reporters Committee but argued that the central purpose 
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addresses of federal employees, the Court found essentially no relevant 
public interest to weigh against the invasion of privacy.116 
Even though Reporters Committee involved Exemption 7(C) and 
Federal Labor Relations Authority dealt with Exemption 6, the Court found 
Reporters Committee squarely on point.117 The only difference between 
Exemptions 6 and 7(C) is “the magnitude of the public interest that is 
required to override the respective privacy interests protected by the 
exemptions,” but the parameters for identifying the public interest under 
either exemption are identical.118 Under Reporters Committee, the public 
interest is only relevant when it furthers FOIA’s central purpose to shed 
light on government conduct.119 Therefore, the public interest in Federal 
Labor Relations Authority was “negligible, at best” because the disclosure 
of employees’ addresses would reveal little if anything about the 
employer–agencies’ conduct.120 
Considering the privacy interest, the Supreme Court noted that even “a 
very slight privacy interest” would outweigh “the virtually nonexistent 
FOIA-related public interest in disclosure.”121 Following again in Reporters 
Committee’s footsteps, the Supreme Court found that the employees had a 
“not insubstantial” privacy interest in their home addresses despite public 
availability in telephone books.122 Especially because the home has special 
privacy protections, employees have at least some privacy interest in their 
addresses.123 
The Supreme Court in this case also reaffirmed the principle that the 
purpose for requesting the information under FOIA is irrelevant.124 
Reporters Committee and Federal Labor Relations Authority limited the 
public interest side of the balancing test by requiring a connection between 
the request’s disclosure and FOIA’s central purpose. Two other doctrines, 
partial disclosure and the presumption of legitimacy, also restrict the public 
interest side of the balance. 
 
test established in that case does not come from FOIA’s text. Id. at 506–07 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
116 Id. at 497 (majority opinion). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 496 n.6. 
119 Id. at 497 (citing Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 500. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 501. 
124 Id. at 496. Because “all FOIA requesters have an equal, and equally qualified, right to 
information,” id. at 499, the consequence of finding in favor of the unions and requiring disclosure 
would be that commercial solicitors would have the same access to the employees’ home addresses as 
the unions would, id. at 501. 
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4. Partial Disclosure and the Presumption of Legitimacy.—In 
between Reporters Committee and Federal Labor Relations Authority, the 
Supreme Court in 1991 considered a request by Haitian asylum seekers and 
their lawyer for the State Department’s records of interviews with Haitians 
who had unsuccessfully sought entry to the United States and were forced 
to return to their home country.125 The Court’s opinion in U.S. Department 
of State v. Ray yielded two significant doctrinal developments. First, it 
indicated that the government might be able to tip the FOIA balancing test 
in favor of nondisclosure by decreasing the weight of the public interest 
through partial disclosure of the requested documents.126 Second, it 
expressed for the first time in the FOIA context that government records 
and conduct enjoy a presumption of legitimacy.127 
In response to a FOIA request, the State Department released redacted 
versions of the requested interviews, but the asylum seekers wanted the 
interviewees’ names.128 The Court applied the Rose balancing test to 
determine whether the privacy interest in the returned Haitians’ names 
outweighed the public interest in disclosure.129 Because the State 
Department justified its redaction of the names under Exemption 6, it had 
to meet the higher burden of a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy,” while the Justice Department in Reporters Committee had only 
been required to satisfy Exemption 7(C)’s lower burden of an “unwarranted 
invasion.”130 
The Supreme Court found a substantial privacy interest because 
disclosing the interviewees’ names would link particular individuals to 
highly personal details and the individuals could be subject to 
embarrassment or retaliatory action if exposed as cooperating with the 
State Department.131 Moreover, the State Department had promised the 
interviewees confidentiality, and the requestors intended to contact the 
interviewees.132 
 
125 U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 166, 168 (1991). 
126 See id. at 178. 
127 Id. at 179; Michael Hoefges et al., Privacy Rights Versus FOIA Disclosure Policy: The “Uses 
and Effects” Double Standard in Access to Personally-Identifiable Information in Government Records, 
12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 30 (2003). But see Halstuk, supra note 68, at 397 (arguing that this 
presumption of legitimacy is at odds with the very purpose of FOIA as a disclosure statute). 
128 Ray, 502 U.S. at 168–69. 
129 See id. at 175. 
130 See id. at 172 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 
U.S. 749, 756 (1989)). 
131 Id. at 175–77. 
132 Id. at 177. Justice Scalia would have found it sufficient to protect the information from 
disclosure by balancing no public interest served by the requested disclosure with the fact that the 
disclosure would reveal “that a particular person had agreed, under a pledge of confidentiality, to report 
to a foreign power concerning the conduct of his own government.” Id. at 181 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
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The Court identified only one relevant public interest in disclosure: 
“knowing whether the State Department has adequately monitored Haiti’s 
compliance with its promise not to prosecute returnees.”133 However, this 
public interest was insufficient to outweigh the individuals’ substantial 
privacy interest because the redacted documents already served this interest 
and additional information would not shed further light on the 
government’s conduct.134 Moreover, the Court found the asserted public 
interest of assessing the honesty of the interviews’ content to be unworthy 
of any weight absent some evidence to overcome the presumption of 
legitimacy for government records and conduct.135 The Court explained the 
need for a presumption of legitimacy as follows: “If a totally unsupported 
suggestion that the interest in finding out whether Government agents have 
been telling the truth justified disclosure of private materials, Government 
agencies would have no defense against requests for production of private 
information.”136 Finding “not a scintilla of evidence . . . that tends to 
impugn the integrity of the reports,” the Court found in favor of 
nondisclosure.137 
As developed in Ray, the public interest side of the balancing test 
suffered two more restrictions: the government can decrease the weight of 
the public interest in particular information through partial disclosure, and 
the government enjoys a presumption of legitimacy in its records and 
conduct. To overcome this presumption of legitimacy, the FOIA requestor 
must provide some support for the allegation of government misconduct. 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
This legislative history and these Supreme Court precedents provide 
the following framework to apply to the issue of whether Exemption 7(C) 
protects federal arrestees’ mug shots from disclosure under FOIA. First, 
this privacy exemption should be narrowly construed.138 Second, whether 
an invasion of privacy from a FOIA disclosure is warranted requires a 
balancing of the privacy interests at stake against the public interests served 
by disclosure.139 Third, previous public disclosure does not mean that the 
privacy exemptions do not apply.140 Fourth, the public interest side of this 
 
133 Id. at 178 (majority opinion). 
134 Id. The Supreme Court in Ray was unanimous in its approval of the partial disclosure doctrine, 
with Justice Scalia writing in his concurring opinion that the majority found “quite correctly[] that the 
public interests here have been ‘adequately served by disclosure of the redacted interview summaries.’” 
Id. at 181 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting id. at 178 (majority 
opinion)). 
135 Id. at 179 (majority opinion). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 See supra Part I.C.1. 
139 See supra Part I.C.1–2. 
140 See supra Part I.C.2. 
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balancing test includes only those interests that serve FOIA’s central 
purpose of informing the public about what the government is up to.141 And 
finally, partial disclosure and the presumption of legitimacy of government 
records and conduct, if applicable, further diminish the weight of any 
public interest served by disclosure.142 
The specific issue of whether individuals have a sufficient privacy 
interest in their mug shots such that disclosure could reasonably be 
expected to constitute an invasion of privacy that outweighs the public 
interest served by disclosure is unsettled. In 1996, after the four Supreme 
Court FOIA privacy cases discussed in Part I, the Sixth Circuit became the 
first federal court of appeals to consider this question.143 Finding no privacy 
interest, the court required disclosure of the mug shots.144 Fifteen years 
later, the Eleventh Circuit and then the Tenth Circuit disagreed.145 This Part 
begins with the factual background of these three cases. Then, it discusses 
the balancing test used by each court. Finally, this Part compares the 
courts’ discussions of the privacy and public interests at stake and their 
conclusions. 
A. Factual Background 
The three federal appellate court cases that have addressed whether 
Exemption 7(C) applies to mug shots all concerned FOIA requests filed by 
members of the press.146 The legal status of the mug shot subjects differed, 
but all of the arrestees had appeared in court before the FOIA request was 
made,147 which arguably diminishes the arrestees’ privacy interest. In the 
Sixth Circuit case, the eight mug shot subjects had been indicted and were 
awaiting trial.148 Their names had been released to the public, and they had 
appeared in court.149 In the Eleventh Circuit case, the mug shot subject was 
Luis Giro, the former president of Giro Investments Group, Inc., who had 
 
141 See supra Part I.C.2–3. 
142 See supra Part I.C.4. 
143 See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 96–97 (6th Cir. 1996). 
144 Id. at 97–98 (concluding that “no privacy rights are implicated” by the release of mug shots 
depicting defendants involved “in an ongoing criminal proceeding, in which the names of the 
defendants have already been divulged and in which the defendants themselves have already appeared 
in open court”). 
145 World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 831–32 (10th Cir. 2012); Karantsalis 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 499 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 
(2012). 
146 World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 826; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 499; Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 
95. 
147 See World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 826; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 499; Detroit Free Press, 73 
F.3d at 95. 
148 Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 95. 
149 Id. 
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appeared in court to plead guilty to securities fraud.150 The mug shot 
subjects in the Tenth Circuit case were six pretrial detainees who had been 
indicted and arraigned, and were awaiting trial.151 
B. The Balancing Test 
The Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits fashioned slightly different 
balancing tests for determining whether Exemption 7(C) applied to the 
requested mug shots.152 The Sixth Circuit’s test consisted of two steps: the 
information’s disclosure “must reasonably be expected to constitute an 
invasion of personal privacy” and “that intrusion into private matters must 
be deemed ‘unwarranted’ after balancing the need for protection of private 
information against the benefit to be obtained by disclosure of information 
concerning the workings of components of our federal government.”153 The 
Eleventh Circuit’s test included three steps: “an invasion is unwarranted 
where (1) the information sought implicates someone’s personal privacy, 
(2) no legitimate public interest outweighs infringing the individual’s 
personal privacy interest, and (3) disclosing the information ‘could 
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.’”154 The Tenth Circuit’s test had two steps: “determine whether 
there is a personal privacy interest at stake; and if there is[,] balance the 
privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure.”155 
Despite some differences, the courts’ tests break down into the same 
three stages. First, the court identifies the privacy interests at stake. Second, 
the court identifies the public interests served by disclosure. And third, the 
court employs the balancing test consistently with Supreme Court 
precedents by weighing the privacy interests against the public interests to 
determine whether the invasion of privacy is unwarranted. If so, 
Exemption 7(C) applies and allows the government to withhold the 
information. 
 
150 Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 499. 
151 World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 826; Complaint at 1, World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
No. 09-CV-00574-TCK-TLW (N.D. Okla. 2011), 2009 WL 8182100. 
152 As an initial matter, the courts considered the threshold question of whether the information was 
compiled for law enforcement purposes. Exemption 7(C) cannot apply unless that condition is met. See 
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2006); John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 157 (1989); FBI v. 
Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982). The FOIA requestors only contested this threshold question in the 
Sixth Circuit case, but the court easily resolved it in favor of the government. Detroit Free Press, 73 
F.3d at 96. In the Tenth and Eleventh Circuit cases, the FOIA requestors conceded that mug shots were 
compiled for law enforcement purposes. World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 827; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 
502. 
153 Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 96 (quoting § 552(b)(7)(C)). 
154 Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 502 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of 
the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989)). 
155 World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 827. 
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C. The Privacy Interest Implicated by Mug Shot Disclosure 
Although the courts used similar approaches, they diverged in their 
outcomes. One explanation for the circuit split on mug shot disclosure is 
the courts’ differing opinions on the privacy interest at stake. In Detroit 
Free Press, the Sixth Circuit did not find any privacy interest in the 
requested mug shots. To reach that conclusion, it distinguished two 
Supreme Court cases that found a sufficient privacy interest to justify 
nondisclosure.156 Unlike the names of the returned Haitians in Ray, which 
the Government had not previously disclosed, the Government had released 
the names associated with the mug shots, and the arrestees’ faces had been 
revealed in public court appearances.157 Unlike the FBI rap sheets in 
Reporters Committee, which offered a compilation of information unrelated 
to active prosecution, the mug shots were a single piece of information 
related to an ongoing prosecution, which “drastically lessened” the need to 
shield the individual defendant from public knowledge that he or she was 
facing criminal charges.158 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the mug shots’ 
release would not disclose any “new information that the indictees would 
not wish to divulge” because “their visages had already been revealed 
during prior judicial appearances.”159 This court appearance provided the 
public with access to the indictees’ image. In high profile cases, at least, 
this provides the media with an opportunity to photograph the indictee. The 
court rejected the Government’s argument that a mug shot “conveys an 
extremely unflattering view of the subject, with strong connotations of 
guilt” and held that the disclosure of indicted arrestees’ mug shots invaded 
no privacy interest when they had previously appeared in court, and 
criminal proceedings were ongoing.160 
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits disagreed with the Sixth Circuit and 
instead found a significant privacy interest in mug shots because what they 
depict is unique. In Karantsalis v. U.S. Department of Justice, the Eleventh 
Circuit found that mug shots are not like other photographs. Instead, mug 
shots are “a vivid symbol of criminal accusation . . . often equated with . . . 
guilt” that “captures the subject in [a] vulnerable and embarrassing 
moment[].”161 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that mug shots 
are not freely available to the public.162 Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that the arrestee had a continuing privacy interest in 
 
156 Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 96–97. 




161 635 F.3d 497, 503 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 (2012). 
162 Id. 
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his mug shot even after he had appeared in open court to plead guilty due to 
the mug shot’s unique characteristics.163 
The Tenth Circuit in World Publishing Co. v. U.S. Department of 
Justice agreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s finding of a privacy interest. 
Instead of distinguishing Reporters Committee like the Sixth Circuit did, 
the Tenth Circuit relied on Reporters Committee as standing for the notion 
that the previous public disclosure of the requested information did not bar 
the application of Exemption 7(C).164 Finally, the court quoted heavily from 
a district court decision, Times Picayune Publishing Corp. v. U.S. 
Department of Justice, which had found that Exemption 7(C) applied to 
mug shots.165 The Tenth Circuit emphasized the Times Picayune court’s 
description of mug shots as “notorious for their visual association of the 
person with criminal activity” and the disclosure’s effect of preserving the 
mug shot’s impact “for posterity.”166 The Tenth Circuit also noted that it 
had found mug shots inadmissible as unduly prejudicial in a different 
case.167 
The newspaper requesting the mug shots argued that the Tenth Circuit 
should consider the practice of most state law enforcement agencies to 
make mug shots available to the public as evidence that mug shots are 
generally available.168 The Tenth Circuit found this argument unpersuasive, 
though, as state practices are irrelevant to USMS practices.169 The 
newspaper also argued that the USMS’s practice after Detroit Free Press of 
disclosing mug shots in the Sixth Circuit meant that mug shots were 
 
163 See id. 
164 See World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 2012). The court 
also mentioned a Tenth Circuit case in which previous disclosure of autopsy photographs and a video to 
a jury in open court also didn’t bar the application of Exemption 7(C). Id. (citing Prison Legal News v. 
Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, 628 F.3d 1243, 1252–53 (10th Cir. 2011)). 
165 37 F. Supp. 2d 472, 477, 479 (E.D. La. 1999). Decided three years after Detroit Free Press, the 
district court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s holding as contrary to Reporters Committee and the 
modification to Exemption 7(C)’s statutory language from “would constitute” to “could reasonably be 
expected to constitute,” which had the effect of broadening the scope of the relevant privacy interest. Id. 
at 476–77. The FOIA request in the case involved the mug shot of a prominent businessman, Edward J. 
DeBartolo, Jr., who owned the San Francisco Forty-Niners. Id. at 473. The USMS took his mug shot 
after he entered his guilty plea to the charge of misprision of a felony, which arose from the criminal 
investigation of former Louisiana Governor Edwin W. Edwards. Id. at 473–74. 
166 World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 827–28 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Times Picayune Publ’g 
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d at 477). 
167 See id. at 829 (citing United States v. Romero-Rojo, 67 F. App’x 570, 572 (10th Cir. 2003)). So 
has the Sixth Circuit. In United States v. Lopez-Medina, the court held that the district court abused its 
discretion when it admitted two mug shots. 461 F.3d 724, 742 (6th Cir. 2006). The court noted that 
“[m]ug shots, in particular, are highly prejudicial, and their visual impact can leave a lasting impression 
on a jury.” Id. at 749. 
168 See World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 829. 
169 Id. The Times Picayune court also found state FOIA practices irrelevant to federal FOIA 
interpretations: “Obviously, a state court’s interpretation of a state’s FOIA also is irrelevant to the 
meaning of the federal statute.” Times Picayune Publ’g Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d at 476. 
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generally available.170 The Tenth Circuit found this similarly unpersuasive 
because the Sixth Circuit’s decision is not binding in other circuits.171 
“Persons arrested on federal charges outside of the Sixth Circuit maintain 
some expectation of privacy in their booking photos.”172 However, at the 
time of this case, release actually depended on the location of the requestor, 
not the location of the arrestee, with the USMS making a special exception 
to its policy for requests coming from the Sixth Circuit.173 Today, the 
USMS no longer releases any mug shots except when the release would 
further a legitimate law enforcement purpose.174 As such, mug shots are not 
widely available. 
The courts of appeals differed on the privacy interest at stake. The 
Sixth Circuit found none.175 After the arrestees appeared in court and law 
enforcement released their names, disclosure of mug shots in response to 
FOIA requests provided no new information. The Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits, however, found significant privacy interests despite arrestees’ 
court appearances because of the unique image that mug shots portray. 
D. The Public Interest Served by Mug Shot Disclosure 
In addition to differing views with respect to the privacy side of the 
balancing test, another cause of the circuit split was the courts’ different 
takes on the public interest served by disclosure of the mug shots. All three 
courts agreed that the Reporters Committee central purpose test applied, 
meaning that the only relevant public interests are those that further FOIA’s 
purpose.176 But the courts split on whether disclosure of mug shots serves 
any relevant public interest. 
The Sixth Circuit in Detroit Free Press considered the public interests 
served by disclosure, even though its finding of no privacy interest meant 
that Exemption 7(C) could not apply.177 Unlike federal employees’ home 
addresses in Federal Labor Relations Authority, which would not shed any 
light on government activity, disclosing mug shots would provide 
“documentary evidence of the designated responsibilities of an agency of 
the federal government.”178 The Sixth Circuit provided two examples of 
 
170 World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 829. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 See Memorandum from Gerald M. Auerbach, supra note 2 (“Until now, the USMS has 
employed an exception for FOIA requests originating within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit . . . .”). 
174 Id. at 2–3. 
175 Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 97 (6th Cir. 1996). 
176 World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 830; Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 504 
(11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 (2012); Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 98. 
177 Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 97–98. 
178 Id. at 96 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994)). 
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how the disclosure of mug shots could serve FOIA’s purpose: (1) by 
revealing that the government detained the wrong person and (2) by 
revealing the government’s treatment of the arrestee.179 The court 
speculated that mug shots would serve both of these purposes much more 
effectively than mere words could.180 By way of example, the court 
hypothesized that had the video of the Rodney King beating not been made 
public, the disclosure of his mug shot showing his severe injuries “would 
have alerted the world that the arrestee had been subjected to much more 
than a routine traffic stop and that the actions and practices of the arresting 
officers should be scrutinized.”181 
According to the Eleventh Circuit in Karantsalis, disclosure would 
serve no public interest.182 Karantsalis had argued that Giro’s facial 
expression would reveal if he had received preferential treatment.183 But the 
court rejected this argument by explaining that facial expressions were a 
poor proxy for preferential treatment and that the public’s curiosity about 
prisoners’ facial expressions does not further FOIA’s central purpose as 
stated in Reporters Committee.184 
In World Publishing Co., the Tenth Circuit rejected all nine of the 
newspaper’s public interest arguments in favor of disclosure, including the 
two mentioned approvingly by the Sixth Circuit.185 Like the Eleventh 
Circuit, the Tenth Circuit found that disclosure would serve no public 
interest related to FOIA’s central purpose of informing citizens about “a 
government agency’s adequate performance of its function.”186 
 
179 Id. at 98. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 504 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“[T]he 
public obtains no discernable interest from viewing the booking photographs, except perhaps the 
negligible value of satisfying voyeuristic curiosities.”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 (2012). 
183 Id. According to Karantsalis, the smirks and smiles of arrestees Bernie Madoff and Joe Nacchio 
in their mug shots showed this preferential treatment. Id. 
184 Id. 
185 World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 831–32 (10th Cir. 2012). The nine 
public interests were: 
(1) determining the arrest of the correct detainee 
(2) detecting favorable or unfavorable or abusive treatment 
(3) detecting fair versus disparate treatment 
(4) racial, sexual, or ethnic profiling in arrests 
(5) the outward appearance of the detainee; whether they may be competent or incompetent or 
impaired 
(6) a comparison in a detainee’s appearance at arrest and at the time of trial 
(7) allowing witnesses to come forward and assist in other arrests and solving crimes 
(8) capturing a fugitive 
(9) to show whether the indictee took the charges seriously. 
Id. at 831. 
186 Id. 
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After identifying the privacy and public interests at stake, the ultimate 
balancing for all three courts was easy. In Detroit Free Press, weighing no 
privacy interest against at least two public interests meant that 
Exemption 7(C) did not apply.187 For the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, 
weighing substantial privacy interests against no public interest meant that 
Exemption 7(C) did apply.188 
E. The Consequences of the Circuit Split 
Until recently, the effective consequence of the circuit split was that 
no federal arrestees’ mug shots were protected from disclosure. As 
mentioned in Karantsalis, the split caused the USMS’s disclosure policy 
for mug shots to hinge on the jurisdiction of the request’s origin.189 As a 
general rule, the USMS did not release mug shots in response to FOIA 
requests.190 But if the USMS received a FOIA request from the jurisdiction 
of the Sixth Circuit, the USMS followed Detroit Free Press and released 
the mug shot.191 Any media outlet could easily exploit this exception by, for 
example, setting up a post office box within the Sixth Circuit.192 Once the 
USMS had released a mug shot to a FOIA requestor within the Sixth 
Circuit, it would then release that mug shot to any FOIA requestor since the 
information entered the public domain with the initial release.193 
A recent example of this 1996–2012 policy at work is in the case of 
Jared Lee Loughner, who attempted to assassinate Congresswoman 
Gabrielle Giffords, killing six people, and shooting twelve others on 
January 8, 2011, in Tucson, Arizona.194 Loughner’s defense counsel sought 
a court order prohibiting the release of his mug shots.195 The Government 
responded to this motion by explaining that it agreed that FOIA did not 
require disclosure and did not oppose the defendant’s motion, but without a 
 
187 Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 97–98 (6th Cir. 1996). 
188 World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 831–32; Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 504. 
189 Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 501. 
190 Id.; Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 14 n.5, Karantsalis v. Dep’t of Justice, 132 S. Ct. 
1141 (2012) (No. 11-342) (cert. denied); Emergency Motion to Bar Release of Post-Arrest 
Photographic Images of Defendant at 2, United States v. Loughner, No. 11CR00187-LAB (D. Ariz. 
Feb. 10, 2011), 2011 WL 479905 (noting that USMS policy “generally prohibits public release of 
prisoner mug shots . . . except in the Sixth Circuit” (quoting Exhibit A, Memorandum from Gerald M. 
Auerbach, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Marshals Serv., to All U.S. Marshals et al. (Aug. 22, 2007))). 
191 Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 190, at 14 n.5; Letter from Lucy A. 
Dalglish, Exec. Dir., Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, to William E. Bordley, Assoc. Gen. 
Counsel, U.S. Marshals Serv. 1 (Jan. 4, 2012) (on file with author). 
192 See Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 501 n.1. 
193 Letter from Lucy A. Dalglish to William E. Bordley, supra note 191, at 1–2. 
194 See Plea Agreement at 12–13, United States v. Loughner, No. CR 11-187-TUC-LABU (D. 
Ariz. Aug. 7, 2012), 2012 WL 3231075. 
195 Emergency Motion to Bar Release of Post-Arrest Photographic Images of Defendant, supra 
note 190, at 1. 
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contrary court order, the USMS “must release the photograph to requesters 
within the jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit pursuant to Detroit Free 
Press.”196 The USMS had received eleven FOIA requests for Loughner’s 
mug shots, four of which came from within the Sixth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction.197 Apparently, the district court denied the defendant’s motion 
because the USMS released Loughner’s mug shot on February 22, 2011, 
twelve days after his motion to prohibit its release.198 Despite the fact that 
Loughner’s arrest and mug shots took place in Arizona within the Ninth 
Circuit, where USMS policy was and still is not to disclose mug shots as an 
invasion of personal privacy, FOIA requestors were able to circumvent this 
policy by simply making their requests from within the Sixth Circuit. Even 
though one federal district court and two federal appellate courts have 
found that the subjects of mug shots have significant privacy interests at 
stake that outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure,199 Loughner and 
other arrestees nationwide had effectively no privacy protection for their 
mug shots against a determined FOIA requestor. 
As of December 12, 2012, however, the USMS abandoned its long-
standing policy of adhering to Detroit Free Press within the Sixth 
Circuit.200 Now, the USMS will not release any mug shots except for 
legitimate law enforcement purposes like apprehending a fugitive.201 The 
result is that despite the Sixth Circuit’s decision still being in full force 
within its jurisdiction, the USMS has decided to blatantly disregard the 
circuit court’s clear holding in its new mug-shot-disclosure policy. An 
executive agency has taken it upon itself to resolve the circuit split and 
ignore the Sixth Circuit’s holding. 
 
196 Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Bar Release of Post-Arrest Photographic 
Images of Defendant at 1–2, United States v. Loughner, No. CR 11-0187-TUC-LAB (D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 
2011), 2011 WL 827230. 
197 Id. at 5. 
198 See, e.g., Jacques Billeaud, Jared Loughner to Be Sentenced After Pleading Guilty to Tuscon 
Mass Shooting, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 8, 2012, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Latest-News-Wires/2012/1108/Jared-Loughner-to-be-sentenced-after-pleading-guilty-to-Tuscon-mass-
shooting. The district court entered a protective order on March 23, 2011, which “directed the [Pima 
County] Sheriff not to release ‘any investigative reports, files or materials relating to the investigation 
of this case.’” United States v. Loughner, 807 F. Supp. 2d 828, 829 (D. Ariz. 2011). The district court 
later modified the protective order to give the Sheriff the option of releasing investigative materials that 
did “not implicate . . . privacy, fair-trial rights, and publicity concerns.” Id. at 836. 
199 See supra notes 165, 188 and accompanying text. 
200 Memorandum from Gerald M. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
201 Id. at 1–3. The new policy also allows for disclosure if the USMS Office of the General Counsel 
determines for itself that a FOIA “requester has made the requisite showing that the public interest in 
the requested booking photograph outweighs the privacy interest at stake.” Id. at 3. It seems unlikely 
that the USMS will find a sufficient showing very often. See Letter from Bruce D. Brown, Exec. Dir., 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press et al., to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice 4–5 (Jan. 30, 2013) (on file with author) (describing “but two examples of what is now the 
routine Marshals Service practice of denying any and all FOIA requests for federal booking 
photographs”). 
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III. RESOLUTION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The contrary decisions of the Sixth Circuit and the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits on whether Exemption 7(C) applies to mug shots cannot be 
reconciled. Without a clear answer from the courts, USMS policy on the 
disclosure of mug shots is unstable and must either severely undermine the 
privacy interest identified by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits or ignore the 
holding of the Sixth Circuit.202 This Part analyzes the privacy and public 
interests at stake in the disclosure of mug shots and concludes that the Sixth 
Circuit should be overruled because arrestees’ privacy interest outweighs 
the negligible public interest served by disclosure. 
A. Mug Shot Disclosure Implicates a Privacy Interest 
Arrestees have a significant privacy interest in their mug shots. Three 
factors contribute to this privacy interest: the fact that the photographs 
convey a unique, humiliating image; FOIA’s legislative history and 
Supreme Court precedents; and technology that gives disclosed mug shots 
staying power well beyond the initial news of the subject’s arrest. 
1. Uniqueness of Mug Shots.—Mug shots are unique in what they 
portray: a particularly embarrassing moment in someone’s life that is 
shrouded in an aura of guilt.203 The Sixth Circuit, in reaching its conclusion 
that arrestees have no privacy interest in their mug shots, treated mug shots 
as just another photograph.204 The court failed to appreciate the uniqueness 
of mug shots. As the other federal courts to consider the mug-shot-
disclosure question acknowledged, mug shots represent “a vivid symbol of 
criminal accusation”205 and “are notorious for their visual association of the 
person with criminal activity.”206 
FOIA requestors’ and courts’ treatment of mug shots further illustrates 
their unique nature. FOIA requestors continue to pursue mug shots even 
after the suspect has appeared in court, and the media has other pictures of 
the suspect to publish.207 This behavior demonstrates the special nature of a 
mug shot because it shows that FOIA requestors themselves do not treat 
mug shots as just another photograph.208 Judges, too, recognize that mug 
shots are special. As the World Publishing Co. decision noted, some courts 
 
202 See supra Part II.E. 
203 World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 827–28 (10th Cir. 2012); Karantsalis 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 503 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 
(2012); Times Picayune Publ’g Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 472, 477 (E.D. La. 1999). 
204 See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 97 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that the 
mug shot subjects’ “visages had already been revealed during prior judicial appearances”). 
205 Karantsalis, 635 F.3d at 503. 
206 World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 827–28 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Times Picayune Publ’g 
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d at 477). 
207 See Times Picayune Publ’g Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d at 477–78. 
208 Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
370 
have found that the admission of mug shots is unduly prejudicial.209 
Because mug shots have unique characteristics, their disclosure invades 
arrestees’ privacy. 
2. Legislative History and Precedents Support Finding a Significant 
Privacy Interest.—In addition to the uniqueness of mug shots 
supporting the conclusion of a significant privacy interest, FOIA’s 
legislative history and Supreme Court precedents support that finding. 
Although Congress designed FOIA as a disclosure statute rather than a 
withholding statute, it always included a caveat related to privacy.210 
Moreover, the legislative history indicates that subsequent FOIA 
amendments intended to broaden the scope of Exemption 7(C).211 
Supreme Court precedents also support the idea that mug shot 
disclosure implicates a significant privacy interest. The Court’s FOIA 
privacy cases indicate a clear commitment to protecting privacy. In only 
one FOIA privacy case did the Supreme Court appear to favor disclosure.212 
And that one case involved Exemption 6,213 which sets a higher bar for the 
necessary privacy interest than Exemption 7(C) does.214 Despite its 
continued commitment to the legislative intent that FOIA exemptions be 
narrowly construed,215 the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to 
interpret the privacy protections broadly.216 Even the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits, which found a significant privacy interest, did not consider the 
aggregate effect of Supreme Court authority from FOIA privacy cases 
pointing toward nondisclosure. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has found a sufficient privacy interest 
justifying the government’s withholding under the FOIA privacy 
exemptions even when the exact same information is already available to 
the public through court records or telephone books.217 In contrast, mug 
shots do not provide the exact same information that is already available to 
the public. The public has access to some of the information disclosed 
through a mug shot, such as the arrestee’s name, the fact of arrest, and 
 
209 World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 829 (citing United States v. Romero-Rojo, 67 F. App’x 570, 572 
(10th Cir. 2003)); see, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 742 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that the district court abused its discretion in admitting two mug shots). 
210 See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. 
211 See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text. 
212 See Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 381–82 (1976). 
213 Id. 
214 See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
215 See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1262 (2011). 
216 Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 72, at 514 (arguing that “the Court has tipped the scales 
significantly in favor of a broadly construed and vaguely framed right to privacy over the public’s right 
of access to government-held information”). 
217 See U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994); U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 753 (1989). 
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other photographs depicting the subject of the mug shot through court 
appearances or, if a celebrity, through other public appearances. But the 
precise depiction of the subject in the mug shot is not available to the 
public. If the Supreme Court is willing to allow an agency to rely on a 
privacy exemption to withhold identical information already available to 
the public, the Supreme Court should find a relevant privacy interest in the 
different information conveyed in an arrestee’s mug shot. The Sixth 
Circuit’s finding of no privacy interest contradicts these precedents. 
To distinguish Reporters Committee, the Sixth Circuit drew a 
distinction between a single piece of information and the compilation of 
information.218 That is, while a mug shot is just one picture, the rap sheets 
at issue in Reporters Committee contained lots of information.219 Although 
the Supreme Court did consider the quantity of information contained in 
the rap sheets important,220 other decisions indicate that whether the 
invasion of personal privacy is unwarranted turns more on the nature of the 
information—no matter how small—rather than on the quantity of 
information revealed about a person. For example, in Federal Labor 
Relations Authority, nowhere did the Supreme Court indicate that the 
length of the list of government employees’ home addresses was 
significant. Instead, the personal nature of the information made the 
invasion of privacy unwarranted, despite the fact that most of those 
addresses would be available in public telephone books.221 Similarly, in Ray 
the Government had already disclosed substantial amounts of information 
about the returned Haitian interviewees, but the additional disclosure of one 
more piece of information—their names—constituted an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy under the higher “clearly unwarranted” 
standard of Exemption 6.222 While the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits 
discussed the unique characteristics of mug shots, even those courts, like 
the Sixth Circuit, did not consider the Supreme Court precedents from 
Federal Labor Relations Authority and Ray. The Eleventh Circuit never 
discussed Ray,223 and the Tenth Circuit only mentioned Ray in the context 
of the public interest.224 Neither court mentioned Federal Labor Relations 
Authority at all. 
 
218 See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 97 (6th Cir. 1996). 
219 See id. 
220 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 749–50, 764. 
221 Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 500–01. 
222 See U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 168–69, 179 (1991). 
223 See Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 500–01, 504 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam) (discussing only the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in the Ray case on the limited issue of whether 
the USMS “conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents” (quoting Ray 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 908 F.2d 1549, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 502 U.S. 164)), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 1141 (2012). 
224 World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 831 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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In another departure from Supreme Court precedents, the Sixth Circuit 
emphasized the reasonableness language in Exemption 7(C).225 In doing so, 
the Sixth Circuit seems to have restricted the weight of the privacy interest 
relevant to its analysis. Its restatement of the balancing test raised the bar 
for the privacy interest by requiring that the information’s disclosure “must 
reasonably be expected to constitute an invasion of personal privacy.”226 
Instead of the word “reasonably,” the Supreme Court has focused on 
interpreting the entire phrase “could reasonably be expected to” as 
indicating the legislative intent to relax the necessary privacy interest to 
justify withholding information.227 The Sixth Circuit’s use of “must” 
suggests a higher burden on the government than the Supreme Court has 
used and that the statutory language supports. Although the Sixth Circuit 
was correct that the burden is on the government agency to show that the 
FOIA exemption applies,228 what the agency must show is that disclosure 
“could reasonably be expected to constitute,”229 not that the disclosure 
“must reasonably be expected to constitute an invasion of personal 
privacy.”230 
3. Technology Magnifies the Privacy Interest.—By allowing for the 
publication of mug shots on the Internet, technology increases the privacy 
interest implicated by the disclosure of mug shots. The Sixth Circuit failed 
to consider the impact of technology. Although the Internet’s pervasiveness 
is more prominent today than in 1996, the Sixth Circuit had the benefit of 
the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Reporters Committee, which made 
clear that technology increased the privacy interest at stake by giving 
otherwise forgotten information staying power.231 Technology today, 
especially with the advent of social media, may have caused some people 
to have a lower expectation of privacy.232 But the Supreme Court has 
insisted that technology increases the weight of the privacy interest under 
FOIA because disclosure would allow long-forgotten information to 
resurface.233 
This conclusion remains valid with respect to mug shots, even if the 
depicted arrestees are users of social media who voluntarily expose a great 
 
225 Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 96 (6th Cir. 1996). 
226 Id. (first emphasis added). 
227 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989). 
228 See U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 172 (1991); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 755. 
229 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2006) (emphasis added). 
230 Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 96 (emphasis added and omitted). 
231 See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 771. 
232 See Samuel Mark Borowski et al., Evolving Technology & Privacy Law: Can the Fourth 
Amendment Catch Up?, A.B.A. SCITECH LAW., Spring 2012, at 14, 14 (“Some would say [social 
media] has eviscerated [our privacy], in part because what one shares openly with the world no longer 
can be reasonably considered private.”). 
233 See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 771. 
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deal of seemingly private information to the public. The Internet gives a 
mug shot staying power by providing public access to this humiliating 
photograph forever. When mug shots were printed in newspapers and not 
plastered on the Internet, the public would only have easy access to the 
photograph near the time of the arrest and disclosure. The humiliation for 
the subject, then, was limited to a short period of time. After discarding the 
newspaper, one would have to mine the archives of a library’s newspaper 
collection in order for the mug shot to resurface. Today, however, the 
Internet allows any curious person, such as a potential employer reviewing 
job applicants, to enter a query into a search engine and instantly retrieve a 
mug shot that would have otherwise been forgotten. This easy access 
continues even after charges have been dropped, the subject of the 
photograph has been acquitted, or the arrestee has been exonerated after a 
long struggle to clear his name after a wrongful conviction. 
Consider the example of Terrill Swift. He was one of the Englewood 
Four, a group of four teenagers who were wrongfully convicted of a rape 
and murder in the Englewood neighborhood of Chicago, Illinois.234 
Through DNA testing, the four men were exonerated.235 Swift spent fifteen 
years in prison for a crime that he did not commit.236 Despite his 
exoneration, the public continues to have access to his mug shot through 
the Internet.237 Although Swift’s ordeal has been widely publicized and he 
chooses to share his story at some public events, he does not have any 
choice when it comes to his mug shot, which serves as a painful reminder 
of his wrongful arrest and conviction.238 Swift’s story provides one example 
of how technology works to magnify the privacy interest at stake in the 
disclosure of mug shots. 
The interest on the privacy side of the Exemption 7(C) balancing test 
is significant. Mug shots portray a unique image of the arrestee. The 
uniqueness of the mug shot means that disclosure invades the subject’s 
privacy even more than in other FOIA privacy cases that involved previous 
disclosure of the exact same information. Moreover, technology increases 
the weight of the privacy interest by giving released mug shots staying 
power. 
 
234 Steve Mills, U.S. Looking at Englewood 4 Case: Teens Convicted in 1994 Rape, Murder Later 
Were Cleared, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2012, at 13. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 See Terrill Swift Mugshot, MUGSHOTS.COM, http://mugshots.com/Blog/Terrill-Swift.2827
35.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2013). 
238 Jon Yates, Problem Solver: Exonerated Man Feels Mugged by Website, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 3, 
2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-03-03/business/ct-biz-0304-problem-swift-20120303_1_
mug-shot-website-joshua-tepfer. 
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B. Disclosure Serves Some Public Interest 
Although the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits reached an appropriate 
conclusion with respect to finding a privacy interest at stake in the context 
of mug shot disclosure, those courts did not properly consider the public 
interest side of the balancing test. Under the central purpose test, which all 
three courts used, mug shot disclosure would reveal information about “a 
government agency’s adequate performance of its function”239 because the 
USMS is a government agency and taking mug shots is one of the USMS 
functions when booking its arrestees. However, the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits could have reached the same result under the balancing test even if 
they had properly considered the Supreme Court’s FOIA doctrines of 
presumption of legitimacy and partial disclosure. 
The Sixth Circuit’s analysis of the public interest served by disclosure 
was not essential to its holding because its finding of no privacy interest 
meant that Exemption 7(C) did not apply.240 However, the discussion of the 
public interest indicates further flaws in the court’s reasoning. The Sixth 
Circuit mentioned the central purpose test in its analysis of the public 
interest in order to factually distinguish Reporters Committee, where the 
Supreme Court found in favor of withholding the information.241 But the 
Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that disclosure of mug shots would reveal 
information about how the USMS performs its functions failed to mention 
the presumption of legitimacy afforded to government conduct.242 The 
Eleventh Circuit in Karantsalis and the Tenth Circuit in World Publishing 
Co. also did not mention the presumption of legitimacy articulated in Ray. 
The Supreme Court made clear in Ray that this presumption of 
legitimacy is relevant to the FOIA calculus.243 Although some have 
challenged the presumption of legitimacy in FOIA jurisprudence as 
circular,244 Ray nevertheless was binding precedent on the federal courts 
facing the mug-shot-disclosure question, and those courts should have 
considered it.245 The FOIA requestors in Karantsalis tried to argue that 
 
239 World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 831 (10th Cir. 2012). 
240 See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 97 (6th Cir. 1996). 
241 See id. at 97–98. 
242 See id. at 100 (Norris, J., dissenting) (“Especially in view of the presumption of legitimacy that 
we accord to agency conduct, this asserted interest is utterly speculative and therefore not entitled to 
weight in the FOIA privacy exemption balancing.”). 
243 U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 179 (1991). 
244 See, e.g., Halstuk, supra note 68, at 396 (arguing that the presumption of legitimacy doctrine 
“requires a FOIA requester to show evidence of wrongdoing in advance to justify getting access to a 
document sought for the purpose of investigating wrongdoing”). 
245 Only the Tenth Circuit came close to mentioning Ray’s presumption of legitimacy in its analysis 
of the relevant public interest served by disclosure of the mug shots but failed to do so directly. See 
World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 831 & n.1 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding that 
“[t]here is . . . little to indicate that the release of booking photos would allow the public to detect racial 
or ethnic profiling without more information, and profiling has not been alleged here”). 
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smirks and smiles on the faces of high-profile arrestees would indicate 
preferential treatment.246 That allegation would not overcome the 
presumption of legitimacy because, as the Eleventh Circuit recognized, the 
connection between a smirk and favorable treatment is a stretch.247 
However, arrestees accusing law enforcement of physically abusing them 
could overcome the presumption of legitimacy because bruises or welts on 
a suspect’s face could be evidence of mistreatment. Absent this second type 
of allegation, proper consideration of the presumption of legitimacy would 
diminish the weight given to any public interest that passed the central 
purpose test. 
Moreover, none of the three circuit courts mentioned Ray’s finding 
that partial disclosure could lessen the public interest served by further 
disclosure. Applying Ray undermines both of the public interests identified 
by the Sixth Circuit. In Detroit Free Press, the government had already 
released the name of the arrestee.248 The arrestee’s court appearances also 
constituted a “partial disclosure” that lessens the public interest in revealing 
the government’s treatment of the arrestee. When an arrestee appears in 
court, a judge sees the arrestee and has an opportunity to address any 
alleged misconduct. Although this appearance does not occur as close in 
time to the arrest as the mug shot, this partial disclosure of the arrestees’ 
identity through a public court appearance combined with the presumption 
of legitimacy causes the balancing test to tip in favor of privacy. 
By applying the presumption of legitimacy and partial disclosure 
doctrines, the public interest side of the Exemption 7(C) balancing test is 
less significant than what the Sixth Circuit found. The public interest is not 
zero because mug shots provide some information about a government 
agency’s conduct in arresting suspects. But with the significant privacy 
interest on the other side of the balance, Exemption 7(C) should apply to 
mug shots. 
FOIA’s text, legislative history, and purpose support the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the privacy exemptions. While the text does not 
explicitly provide for the central purpose test,249 FOIA’s exemptions invite 
balancing. The legislative history also reveals that Congress intended for 
the privacy exemptions to strike a balance between “protection of an 
individual’s private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the 
preservation of the public’s right to governmental information.”250 Without 
 
246 Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497, 504 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 (2012). 
247 See id. 
248 Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 97 (6th Cir. 1996). 
249 See U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 507–08 (1994) (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Reporters Committee ‘core purpose’ limitation is not found in 
FOIA’s language. . . . [Likewise], no such limitation appears in the text of any FOIA exemption.”). 
250 See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965) (explaining the meaning of “clearly unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy” in Exemption 6). 
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some limits on the public interest side of the balance, a purely speculative 
accusation of government wrongdoing could trump legitimate privacy 
concerns. Simply because the government happens to have records in its 
possession does not mean that the public should have access to those 
records when they do not shed light on the government’s action. The 
central purpose test is consistent with FOIA’s purpose251 by emphasizing 
the public’s right to know about what the government is up to without 
allowing the public interest to eliminate the privacy exemptions.252 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated its firm commitment to this test 
as the appropriate inquiry for determining the strength and relevance of the 
public interest served by disclosure.253 
While the decisions in Karantsalis and World Publishing Co. more 
faithfully followed FOIA legislative history and Supreme Court precedents 
than Detroit Free Press did in analyzing the privacy interest, Detroit Free 
Press correctly identified public interests served by disclosure that pass the 
central purpose test. However, the presumption of legitimacy and partial 
disclosure diminish the weight of these public interests. The presumption of 
legitimacy means that courts evaluating FOIA requests for mug shots 
should presume that the government’s conduct in arresting the suspects was 
legitimate. With partial disclosure, the arrestees’ appearance in court 
provides the public with access to some of the information that disclosing a 
mug shot would also reveal. Therefore, the public interest side of the 
balancing test to evaluate government conduct in arresting suspects is 
slight. Although Karantsalis and World Publishing Co. did not consider 
these doctrines, they still reached the right result under the balancing test 
by finding that the significant privacy interest of arrestees outweighs the 
public interest served by the disclosure of mug shots. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the three federal appellate courts considering the issue of mug 
shot disclosure under FOIA was completely correct in its analysis. The 
Sixth Circuit failed to find any privacy interest despite Supreme Court 
precedents strongly supporting the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ contrary 
 
251 But see Martin E. Halstuk & Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest Be Damned: Lower Court 
Treatment of the Reporters Committee “Central Purpose” Reformulation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 983, 991 
(2002) (arguing that Reporters Committee “seemingly contravenes the legislative intent of the FOIA by 
narrowly defining a disclosable record as only official information that reflects an agency’s 
performance and conduct”). 
252 See Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public’s Right to Know: The “Central 
Purpose” of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41, 69–71 (1994). 
253 See, e.g., Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004); Bibles v. Or. 
Natural Desert Ass’n, 519 U.S. 355, 355–56 (1997) (per curiam); Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 
at 509 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I am mindful, however, that the preservation of 
Reporters Committee, unmodified, is the position solidly approved by my colleagues, and I am also 
mindful that the pull of precedent is strongest in statutory cases.”). 
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conclusions on that point. But even those courts did not fully consider the 
impact of the Supreme Court’s FOIA privacy cases on the issue of mug 
shot disclosure. On the public interest side of the balancing test, none of the 
courts considered the presumption of legitimacy or partial disclosure 
doctrines from Ray, which both cast doubt on public interests that the Sixth 
Circuit identified. 
While the USMS has recently changed its mind on its mug-shot-
disclosure policy, that change is unstable so long as the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in Detroit Free Press remains. Short of the Supreme Court 
weighing in to settle the issue, the Sixth Circuit should reconsider its 
position to make sure that federal mug shot subjects get the privacy 
protection under FOIA Exemption 7(C) that they deserve. Ultimately, 
privacy should prevail over the public interest when it comes to the 
disclosure of mug shots. 
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